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Economists have an instinctively negative reaction to any government
programthat creates a "notch," that is, a discontinuity in a budget con-
straint. Forexample, welfare programs like public housing are structured
so that a finite lump of benefits is lost all at once when a household's
income crosses a certain threshhold. Such notches deserve their bad
reputation --theyeffectively impose a high marginal tax rate over a
small income range, which no doubt discourages work and promotes welfare
dependency.
However,this paper argues that in other contexts, tax and subsidy plans
withnotches should at least be considered as serious contenders when public
policy seeks to encourage or discourage some activity. Using simulations,
we show how notch schemes can dominate traditional linear schemes using a
standard efficiency criterion.
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I. Introduction
Tax and transfer systems provide numerous incentives that
influence people's behavior. Sometimes, these incentives are
inadvertent by—products of the need to raise revenue. Other
times, public policy deliberately aims to change behavior. In
either case, the approach typically favored by economists is to
change the slope of some relevant budget constraint by
introducing a tax or a subsidy. A Pigouvian emissions fee is a
clear example.
Economists have an instinctively negative reaction to any
program that creates a "notch," that is, a discontinuityin a
budget constraint. Perhaps the best known example of a notch
comes in the welfare system, where such programs as Medicaid and
public housing are structured so that a finite lump of benefits
is lost all at once when a household's income crosses a certain
threshhold. The reason for economists' negative attitudes toward
this notch is clear: for people with low earnings potential, the
notch effectively imposes a very high marginal tax rate over a
small income range, which no doubt discourages work and promotes
welfare dependency.
Such notches deserve their bad reputations. However, this
paper argues that in other contexts tax and subsidy planswith
notches may have been dismissed too cavalierly, and should at
least be considered as serious contenders when public policy
seeks to encourage or discourage some activity. Since this idea
is so foreign to our normal way of thinking, perhaps we shouldPage 2
develop the intuition behind it at theoutset.1
A standard tax or subsidy alters the relative price that
everyone faces, and hence distorts everyone'sbehavior. A notch,
on the other hand, leaves the effective price unchanged ——
except,of course, at the notch, where the price is undefined.
Consequently, a standard tax or subsidy imposes small excess
burdens on everyone, while a notch imposes large excess burdens
on a small number of people. Stated this way, it is not
immediatelyobviousthat the notch approach is always inferior.
Indeed, this paper produces several examples in which notches are
clearly superior.
Although notches have a bad name among economists, they are
not uncommon in the private sector. Some airlines stimulate the
demand for air travel not by lowering the price per ticket, but
by offering a free ticket for passengers who haveflown more than
a certain number of miles. Similarly, banks and savingsand loan
associations occasionally attempt to increase deposits not by
offering a higher rate of interest, but by awarding a "gift" to
customers who deposit an amount exceeding some specified level.
This paper argues that notches may sometimes be appropriate in
the public sector as well.
The paper is organized as follows. Section II uses a simple
example --thetax deductibility of charitable contributions ——
toexplain the basic ideas, develop a methodology for addressing
the issue, and then compare the relative efficacy of notches
versus traditional linear subsidies in stimulatingcharitablePage 3
giving. We conclude that a notch incentive may dominate a
traditional linear incentive. Some practical problems involved
in implementing notch incentives are discussed in Section III,
and Section IV contains some concluding remarks.
II. Stimulating Demand for a Commodity
Suppose the government wants to stimulate one person's
charitable giving, which we denote in Figure I by F (for
"favored" commodity). If the person's marginal tax rate is t,
deductibility of charitable contributions lowers the effective
price of each dollar of charity from $1 to $(l-t), thereby
pivoting the budget constraint between F and all other goods from
MN out to MO. As a consequence, the individual's optimum moves
from to E2; charitable giving winds up at F2.
The government could induce an identical increase in charity
by the following notch system: if the individual donates F2 or
more, he receives a lump sum subsidy equal to DE2; otherwise, he
receives nothing. The budget constraint associated with this
notch scheme is MDE2H, and the optimum choice remains E2. Thus
the notch and linear schemes have exactly the same revenue cost,
DE2, and induce the same behavior.This discussion illustrates
an obvious point. As long as only one individual is being
considered ——orequivalently, if it is possible to design a
eparate notch scheme for each individual —-thenthere is
nothing to choose between a linear incentive and a notch
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have heterogeneous tastes, and all taxpayers (at least within the
same income class) face the same budget constraint, then the
notch and linear subsidy schemes can have quite different
implications.
To see why, consider Figure II. Under the status quo,
individuals A, B, and C all face budget constraint MN. Individual
A's highest attainable indifference curve is labelled UA, and
similarly for B and C. Now suppose that a notch subsidy of G is
granted to anyone who donates at least F*. The budget line
confronting all three individuals becomes MDKI. As seen in the
diagram, individual A's behavior is unchanged. Individual C
moves up to indifference curve U'. Note that the movement from
to U' induced by the subsidy creates no excess burden ——it
is equivalent to a lump sum grant. Now consider individual B.
His best choice under the notch subsidy is right at the notch
(indifference curve U'B). In contrast to C, the subsidy to B does
create an excess burden. Individual B would be better off with a
lump sum subsidy of G, which would produce budget constraint HI,
allowing B a utility level U"B which exceeds U'B.
Thus, as we stated in the introduction, under a notch
scheme, some individuals face no excess burdens, and some face
large ones. The aggregate excess burden depends on the
distribution of individual tastes. Generally, the more people
€hat behave like B, the higher will be the total excess burden
under a notch. The revenue costs of notch subsidies similarly












Can it be that the notch scheme is preferable to a
conventional linear subsidy? Because heterogeneity of the
population is the essence of the matter, it is difficult to
obtain an analytical answer even for very simple assumptions
about utility functions and the joint distribution of their
parameters. For this reason, we rely on simulation techniques.
Our strategy is to posit specific utility functions and numerical
distributions of their parameters, and investigate the relative
desirability of notch and linear incentives under alternative
assumptions.
11.1 Basic Set—Up
Let an individual's utility level, U, depend on his
consumption of a composite commodity, Y, whose price is equal to
unity, and F, the favored commodity. Suppose the utility
function is of the constant elasticity of substitution form:
(1) U =[aF+ (l_a)Y]/b, b > —1,
where a and b are taste parameters, and the elasticity of
substitution is given by =l/(l+b).With a linear subsidy at
rate s, the individual's budget constraint is:
(2) (ls)PFF + Y =M+ Z
where is the price of the favored good, M is income, and Z
is any lump sum transfers (positive or negative) from the
government.






where K =[(1—a)/a].Note that since the utility function is
homothetic, the Engels' curves are rays through the origin as
long as Z is proportional to M. Thus, any results that apply to
one income level can be scaled up or down to apply to other
income levels.
It will be useful to have a formula for the indirect utility






Q(s) = + K[(l—s)PFf
11.2 Analysis of a Linear Subsidy.
We turn first to the efficiency and revenue consequences of
a linear subsidy. To compute the subsidy's excess burden, wePage 7
must find the monetary value of the difference between the
utility level achieved by the subsidy, and the level that would
have been achieved had the subsidy been given as a lump sum.
Thus, note that the cost to the treasury for a given individual
is sFPF. Suppose that sFPF had been given to the individual as a
lump sum, without distorting relative prices. Then, using
equation (5), utility would be:
M +sFP
As is well known, in the absence of other distortions, a
price—distorting subsidy raises utility by less than a lump sum
subsidy of the same amount. If V0 is the utility level with the
lump sum, and VL is utility with the linear subsidy, then we
define the excess burden of the subsidy as the amount of money we
would have to take away from the individual at V0 to lower his











The aggregate excess burden of the linear subsidy is simply
the sum of BL across the individuals, and the total cost to the
treasury is the sum of sPFF.
11.3 Analysis of a Notch Subsidy
Now consider a scheme which awards a lump sum subsidy of G
to individuals who donate at least some critical amount F*, and
zero otherwise. In calculating the excess burden of the notch
subsidy, three possibilities must be considered.
(a) The individual's optimal decision is unchanged. In this
case, there is no excess burden and no budgetary cost. This case
corresponds to individual A in Figure II.
(b) The individual is induced to consume right at the notch.
Here the cost of the subsidy is clearly G per individual. There
is also an excess burden, which corresponds to the difference
between utility levels U"B and U'B in Figure II. To find the
individual's utility level at the notch, we must evaluate the





Following the reasoning behind equation (6), the utility if the
same subsidy had been granted as a lump sum is:
rM +G]A(o)_l/b
LQ(Q)Page 9
Hence, the excess burden for such an individual, BN, is
implicitly defined by:
-b M+G—B




a(F*)b +(1a)(M+G — PF*)b1 b
(7) BN =M+G — Q(O){ A(O)
F
Cc) The individual consumes more than the critical quantity
F* after the notch scheme is imposed. In this case, the notch
subsidy is equivalent to a lump sum transfer, so again there is
no excess burden. But there is a cost to the treasury, namely G.
This corresponds to individual C in Figure II.
To summarize: If there are a individuals in category (a),
in category (b), and in category Cc), then the total cost
of the notch subsidy is +n)G,and the total excess burden
is the sum of BN defined by equation (7) across the individuals
in category (b).
11.4 Simulation Strategy
The simulations assume a population of 499 people.
Individuals are indexed by their value of a, the share parameter
In the utility function. The values of a are distributed
uniformly between 0.0002 and0.O998. Within each simulation, thePage 10
elasticity of substitution is the same for all individuals. But
its value is varied across simulations. The units of F are chosen
to make F' its before-tax price, equal to one. Each person's
income, M, is also normalized to 1. Thus the simulations should
be thought of as applying to a given income class. Since our
utility functions are homothetic, this is not a substantive
restriction.
We first compute aggregate demand for F in the absence of
any subsidies. Then we impose a linear subsidy of 20% Cs =0.2),
and compute the amount by which consumption of F is stimulated,
the revenue cost to the government, and the total excess burden.
Next, we turn to the notch subsidy, and search over various
combinations of G and F* to find those that yield the same total
demand for F. In general, an infinite number of notch schemes are
consistent with any fixed value of aggregate F. For example, if
F* is set very high, but at the same time G is large, it might be
possible to achieve the same aggregate value of F as when both
parameters are low. Criteria for choosing among the various
notch schemes are discussed below.
II .5ACob b-jult
We beginby discussing the Cobb—Douglas case.5 Column 1 of
TableI shows that the aggregate consumption of the favored good
inthe absence of any subsidy is 24.3 units. Column 2 indicates
that imposition of a 20% subsidy increases the quantity demanded
lo 30.5.6 The cost to the treasury of the subsidy is 6.1, and
the associated excess burden is 0.62. Thus the subsidy isPage 1OA
Table I
Subsidy to Consumption of a Commodity
Cobb—Douglas Utility Functions
Uniform Distribution of a
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Status Quo Linear Notch Notch Notch
Subsidy Subsidy Subsidy Subsidy
(a) (b) Cc)
s=0.2 F*=.03 F*.183 F*= 0.116
G =.164 G =0.035 G =0.015
Total
Demand
for F 24.3 30.5 30.5 30.5 30.5
Total
Revenue
Cost 0 6.1 81.9 2.4 2.6
Total
Excess
Burden 0 0.62 1.04 2.0 1.19
TEC
('=0.2) 0 1.8 17.4 2.5 1.7
TEC
(m=0.4) 0 3.1 33.8 3.0 2.2Page 11
relatively efficient in this case: the deadweight loss per dollar
of subsidy is only about 10 cents.7 This is worth pointing out,
because it shows that the simulation is set up to make the linear
subsidy scheme hard to beat.
Our next goal is to devise a notch scheme that induces the
same change in behavior, and compute its revenue cost and excess
burden. As just noted, an infinite number of notch schemes can do
the trick. Columns 3, 4, and 5 compare three possibilities.
In column 3 (notch subsidy (a)), the notch is set at a
relatively low level of consumption, F* =.03units, which is
about half the mean consumption level under the linear subsidy.
With F* set this low, we must induce essentially everyone in the
populationto donate at least F* in order to reach the target for
aggregate donations. And, to accomplish this, a large grant of G
=.164(16.4% of total income) is required. The revenue costs of
settingF* at such a low level are revealed in the second row:
the cost to the treasury is 81.9, about thirteen times greater
•than the cost of the linear subsidy. The excess burden of 1.04
also far exceeds that of the linear subsidy. It is clear that
notch subsidy (a) is a perfectly dreadful idea.
Under notch subsidy (b) in column 4, the notch is set at a
very high value, 0.183, or 18.3% of irrcome. This is about three
times the average consumption level under the linear subsidy.
With required consumption so high, most people do not take
advantage of the subsidy; only 15% receive the grant of 0.035. As
a consequence, the revenue cost is far lower than underthePage 12
linear subsidy, only 2.4. However, those people who do accept
the subsidy have their behavior distorted considerably; the
excess burden is 2.0, more than triple the excess burden under
the linear subsidy.
A final possibility, notch subsidy (c), is exhibited in
column 5 of Table I.The notch is placed at a lower level than
in column 4 but a higher level than in column 3: F* =.116.The
revenue cost is higher than in column 4, but the excess burden is
lower. This is because the people whose behavior changes are
nearer the notch, and hence their decisions are less distorted.
The results in Table I taken together suggest that while
some notch incentives (such as notch subsidy (a)) will do quite
horribly compared to linear schemes, others will do quite well.
Both schemes (b) and (c), although they have higher excess
burdens than the linear subsidy, have much lower revenue costs.
On balance, therefore, they might be preferable.
This observation leads to an important question: Given that
we are judging subsidy systems on the basis of two criteria,
revenue cost and excess burden, how are we to compare them when
one is better on one criterion and the second on the other?
There are two possibilities:
(1) The most natural approach is to compare the schemes on
the basis of what we call total efficiency cost (TEC), defined as
the sum of the excess burden arising from distorting the demand
for the favored good plus the efficiency cost of raising the
revenues needed to finance the subsidy. If taxes were lump sum,Page 13
the efficiency cost of replacing the revenue lost by the subsidy
would be zero, and the TEC would just be the standard excess
burden of the subsidy. However, real world tax finance creates
its own efficiency costs. If m is the marginal excess burden
created by a dollar of taxes raised in the private sector, then
the TEC is just m times the revenue loss plus the excess burden
from distorting the consumption of F.
Whatisthe value of m? The answer depends on what tax
instrument the government uses, and the supply and demand
elasticities of the item(s) being taxed. Traditionally, the
marginal excess burden of taxation has been supposed to be quite
low——practically zero. Recent estimates are higher. Ballard,
Shoven and Whalley (1982) estimate that the marginal excess
burden of a dollar raised via the corporate tax is about $0.50.
This is the same as the estimate obtained by Stuart (1984) for
the whole tax system. Hausman's (1981) econometric study of
labor supply suggests that if a dollar is raised by a tax on
labor income, the marginal excess burden is about $0.42. In the
absence of agreement on what the marginal excess burden of
taxation is, it makes no sense to restrict ourselves to one
figure. we therefore do calculations assuming values of m of
both 0.2 and 0.4 which, if anything, seem on the low side.8
The TEC figures are recorded in the fourth and fifth rows of
Table I. Assuming m =0.2,notch subsidy (b) with a TEC of 2.5,
is inferior to the linear subsidy, whose score is 1.8. However,
notch subsidy (c), with a TEC of 1.7, is better than the linearPage 14
subsidy. In fact, when m =0.2,notch subsidy (c) is the most
efficient of all possible notch subsidies in the sense of having
the minimum TEC. When m =0.4,both notch schemes (b) and (c)
are better than the linear subsidy.
These results suggest that the outcome depends critically on
the assumed value of in. The reason is clear. Reasonable notch
schemes make smaller demands on the treasury than linear schemes,
but often have larger excess burdens. If m is high, a great deal
of weight is given to the smaller revenue cost, thereby enhancing
the attractiveness of notch schemes. If inislow, the excess
burden is relatively more important —-whichenhances the
attractiveness of linear schemes.
(2) The second way to compare various subsidy programs
questions the relevance of excess burden in thiscontext. After
all, the whole exercise of measuring excess burden assumesthat
the subsidy "distorts" behavior away from the optimum.This
might, of course, be the case if the subsidy wasinstituted
solely in response to political pressures. Onthe other hand, it
is possible that the subsidy is deliberately put in placeto
correct an externality.9 As is well known, a subsidylevied on a
good that generates positive externalities mightactually enhance
efficiency, that is, have a negative excess burden.In this case,
the standard excess burden calculation does not reallymake
sense.
This discussion leads to the following conclusion. In some
instances, it may make more sense simply to look atthe budgetaryPage 15
cost of achieving the required increase in consumption of the
favored good, making no allowance for excess burden. And a glance
at Table I indicates that if minimizing revenue cost is the sole
criterion, a well-chosen notch scheme may well be superior to a
linear subsidy)0 By targetting the subsidy to those whose
tastes for the favored commodity are relatively intense, the
notch subsidy does not "waste" money on those whose consumption
is not stimulated very much.
On the basis of Table I, then, we conclude that notch
subsidies may be better than linear subsidies. This is more
likely to be true when the distortion that arises is not
considered to generate a deadweight burden, or when a relatively
high weight is put on the efficiency costs of financing revenue
losses. But it can also be true in other cases.
11.6 Changing the Elasticity of Substitution
How does the relative attractiveness of linear and notch
subsidies depend upon the elasticity of substitution between the
favored commodity and all other goods? To answer this question,
we repeated the simulation assuming d =0.5and=1.5.The
results are reported in Table II. In each case, we:
(i) compute consumption of the favored good in the absence
of any subsidy (columns 1 and 4);
(ii) compute consumption, revenue cost, and excess burden
associated with a 20% linear subsidy (columns 2 and 5);
(iii) use numerical methods to find the best notch subsidyPage 15A
Table II
Subsidy to Consumption of a Commodity
Alternative Elasticities of Substitution
Uniform Distribution of a
-=0.5 '=1.5
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Status Quo LinearNotch Status QuoLinear Notch
SubsidySubsidy Subsidy Subsidy
s =0.2F*= 0.28 s =0.2 F*= .04
G= 0.03 G= .007
Total
Demand
for F 87.4 99.7 99.7 6.90 9.62 9.62
Total
Revenue
Cost 0 19.9 6.4 0 1.92 0.95
Total
Excess
Burden 0 .92 2.80 0 0.29 0.51
TEC
(m0.2) 0 4.90 4.09 0 0.68 0.70
TEC
(m=0.4) 0 8.89 5.37 0 1.06 0.89Page 16
that induces the same amount of consumption as the linear
subsidy, where "best" means that the TEC is at a minimum for m =
0.2 .
When=0.5,the notch subsidy has an excess burden about
three times that of the linear subsidy, but a revenue cost less
than one third as large. This pattern is already familiar from
the Cobb—Douglas case examined in Table I.If we consider
revenue costs alone, the notch scheme is certainly superior by a
wide margin. If we consider both excess burden and efficiency
costs, and assume m =0.2,we find that the TEC for the notch
scheme (4.09) is about 17% smaller than that of the linear scheme
(4.90). In the Cobb—Douglas case of Table I, the comparable
improvement was only about 8%. This suggests that the
attractiveness of the notch subsidy is enhanced when the
elasticity of substitution decreases.
This impression is confirmed when we examine the results for
=1.5reported in the right side of Table II. When=1.5,
the total efficiency cost of the notch subsidy when m =0.2
slightly exceeds that for the linear subsidy. To be sure, the
notch scheme is still much cheaper, but this is not enough to
counter its deficiency on the excess burden criterion when m =
0.2.However, when m =0.4,the notch scheme is preferred to the
linear scheme even with '= 1.5.
The explanation for these results lies in the fact that low
values oftranslate into low price elasticities of demand for
F. Thus, relatively large values of the linear subsidy rate arePage 17
required in order to achieve any given changein the demand for
F. For example, Table II shows that with '= 0.5,a 20% subsidy
raises consumption only 14%. Because the linear subsidyworks
entirely via price effects, low elasticities ofsubstitution make
the linear subsidy more expensive.
On the other hand, the notch subsidy achievesmuch of its
stimulus through income effects and, with a CES utilityfunction,
the income elasticity of demand is unity regardless ofthe value
of the elasticity of substitution. (See equation (3).) Thus,
notch subsidies are more attractive in the presence oflow values
of the elasticity of substitution, ceteris paribus.
11.7 Changing the Distribution of a
So far we have been assuming that the share parameter, a,is
distributed uniformly over the interval (0,.l). We nowconsider
some simple non—uniform linear distributions. Specifically,we
continue to assume that there are a total of 499 peopleand that
a runs between .0002 and .0998, but wemake the density of a
skewed. Figure 111(a) shows the assumed distribution of afor a
population with more F—lovers than F—haters; Figure111(b) shows
the opposite case. Our analyses of non—uniformdistributions
assume Cobb—Douglas utility functions andthese linear densities.
Results are reported in Table III. As before, foreach
configuration of utility function parameters, we presentthe
equilibrium under the assumption of no subsidy, alinear subsidy




Figure lIla Figure IlIb
A Population with more F-Lovers A Population with more F-Haters
weight
0 0.1 0 0.1Page 17B
Table III
Subsidy to Consumption of a Commodity
Cobb-Douglas Utility Functions
Linear Distribution of a
More F—Haters More F—Lovers
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
StatusLinearNotch Status Linear Notch
Quo Subsidy Subsidy Quo SubsidySubsidy




for F 16.2 20.3 20.3 32.5 40.7 40.7
Total
Revenue
Loss 0 4.05 1.78 0 8.13 3.20
Total
Excess
Burden 0 0.42 0.97 0 0.82 1.38
TEC
(m0.2) 0 1.23 1.22 0 2.45 2.02
TEC
(m0.4) 0 2.04 1.69 0 4.07 2.66Page 18
same behavioral change as the linear subsidy.
Regardless of whether the population is comprised mostly of
F-lovers or F—haters, the notch subsidy has much lower revenue
costs, but much higher excess burdens than the linear subsidy.
However, in all cases the notch subsidy is preferred on the basis
of TEC ——albeitby a trivial margin in one case.
Note that on the basis of relative TEC, the notch subsidy is
more preferred when the population is heavily weighted toward
F-lovers. When m =0.2and the population has more F—haters, the
TEC of the notch scheme is 98% of the linear subsidy's. But when
the population has more F—lovers, the comparable figure is 82%.12
Why? The fundamental advantage of a notch scheme is that it
targets the subsidy to the "right" people. This advantage is
worth most when many people have intense preferences for the
commodity. With a lot of the population near the notch, few
people have to be "dragged" very far in order to reach the notch,
and therefore the excess burden per unit of induced consumption
is relatively small.
11.8 Summary
We have compared notch and linear subsidies for stimulating
consumption of a favored commodity, such as charitable giving. In
every case we have examined, a notch subsidy can stimulate the
same increase in consumption at a lower cost to the treasury.
Hence, if revenue loss is the only criterion, the notch subsidy
is clearly superior. However, if the increase in demand for the
favored commodity induced by the subsidy is viewed as adistortion, then the associated excess burden must also be taken
into account. Here, notch schemes seem to do systematically worse
than linear subsidies. However, when the revenue costs and
excess burdens are suitably aggregated to find a measure of total
efficiency cost, the notch scheme often doesbetter.13
In this context, it is important to remember that we did not
set out to establish that notch schemes are generally, or even
typically, superior to linear schemes. Our purpose was only to
show that notch schemes might be superior under circumstances
that are in no sense pathological. This seems to have been shown.
III. Some Practical Problems
Three major practical problems would arise in attempts to
implement notch incentives:
1. Differences across income classes.
Our simulations examine populations with identical
endowments. With a homothetic utility function, once a notch
incentive that "works" for one income class is found, the same
scheme can be scaled upward or downward and applied to every
class. If people's utility functions are not homothetic, then
the analysis must be done separately for each income group.
Moreover, if policy makers wish to achieve certain distributional
goals at the same time that behavior is being modified, then, as
usual, efficiency criteria alone cannot be used to compare
various plans. An explicit social welfare function with
Page 19Page 20
distributional weights must be introduced. Neither of these
problems is "new" to the notch approach; they both arise in the
linear case as well.
2.Bunching (Intertemporal Substitution)
Like all nonlinear tax and transfer plans, notch subsidies
provide an incentive to bunch the subsidized activity into
particular time periods. For example, if a $100 grant is given
in any year in which charitable giving exceeds $1000, then
individuals who would otherwise give $500 per year might instead
give zero and $1000 in alternate years.
The seriousness of this problem depends on the context. In
the case of charitable giving, it might be quite serious;
bunching is therefore a formidable obstacle to the implementation
of a notch subsidy. In other contexts, it might be less serious
(see Section IV). Where intertemporal substitution is a severe
problem, the remedy is obvious: lifetime averaging, which would
make the lifetime, rather than the year, the relevant unit of
time. In the case of charitable giving, averaging seems quite
feasible. After all, the gift tax in the United States is now
handled precisely in this way. In other applications, averaging
may be more difficult administratively.
In any case, the principle is clear: notches will not look
very attractive in applications where the elasticity of
intertemporal substitution is high and/or where lifetime
averaging is difficult.Page 21
3. Cheating (Interpersonal Substitution)
Taxpayers might collude in order to obtain notch subsidies
or avoid notch taxes. If a grant of $100 is awarded to anyone
who gives $1000 or more in a year, then two individuals who
donate $500 each are ineligible. However, if one turns over his
receipts to the other (or lets the other do his donating), the
latter can claim the $100 subsidy, and then split it with his
collaborator.
Is this likely to be a serious problem? It depends upon the
transactions costs of such collaboration, and these will vary
from case to case. In the case of transferring charitable
contributions, these might be fairly low. (However, the answer
depends in part on the importance that people attach to having
their name associated with their contribution.) In contrast,
cheating in other contexts seems less likely (see again Section
IV).
IV. Conclusions
We have analyzed the consequences of notch incentives ——
taxesand subsidies that create jumps in budget constraints —-as
opposed to linear incentives, which simply change the slopes of
budget constraints. Unlike linear incentives, notch schemes do
not distort the behavior of every person. Rather, if properly
designed, they induce individuals to self—select so that those
who are most willing to change their behavior are the ones whoPage 22
receive the subsidy (or avoid the tax). In the cases we have
examined, notch schemes do not uniformly dominate linear schemes.
However, they come out on top often enough that they deserve
serious consideration as policy options.
For purposes of exposition we have concentrated on the issue
of charitable giving. However, a number of other possible
applications exist:
a) Housing. Under current law, homeowners receive
substantial tax benefits through the personal income tax.
Ostensibly, the purpose of these provisions is to stimulate
homeownership and they seem to have been effective in increasing
the number of homeowners. But, at the same time, the subsidy
increases the amount of housing purchased by homeowners (see
Rosen (1979)). A notch scheme targetted just at homeownership ——
alump sum reduction of tax liability for those who own homes ——
couldbe designed to have the same effect on the homeownership
rate, with less severe revenue and efficiency consequences.
Since the subsidy for homeownership would presumably apply only
to one house per family, neither intertemporal nor interpersonal
substitution should create problems.14'15
b) Education. Currently, tuition tax credits are being
considered as a way to promote higher education. A notch version
of this scheme could give a family a lump sum payment only after
(say) a certain number of years of college education had been
bought. Since each child in the household could receive thePage 23
subsidy only once, the bunching issue would riot arise. And
cheating would require falsification of college records. Hence
neither problem seems important in this context.
c) Saving. There are several provisions in the tax code
designed to encourage savirig, and others have been proposed.
Generally, these are linear subsidies that raise the return to
saving, perhaps up to some maximumamount.16 Consider as an
alternative a notch subsidy that offers a lump sum grant to those
who save more than a certain amount. (The threshhold amount
would obviously be keyed to income.)We have done some
extensive simulations with such plans, and found that they often
(but not always) are a better way to stimulate saving than
replacing the income tax by a consumption tax.
The drawback is a practical one: intertemporal substitution
is a potentially devastating problem in this case. Individuals
can easily bunch their saving into particular years so as to
avail themselves of the notch subsidy without really saving more
in the long run. Indeed, the problem is worse than that because
savings eligible for the subsidy would presumably have to be
deposited into particular accounts (analogous to IRAs).
Individuals could easily transfer funds into and out of these
accounts in order to give the appearance of bunching their saving
even though, in fact, they were saving at a smooth rate. In
brief, the problem of intertemporal substitution may preclude the
use of notch subsidies to encourage saving.Page 24
d) Welfare Reform. As mentioned in the introduction, our
current welfare system is characterized by notches that provide
strong disincentives to work. In particular, poor families lose
substantial benefits such as Medicaid and public housing when
their earnings cross certain threshholds. Economists have
strongly condemned the current system for its adverse incentives.
Many have advocated replacing it by a negative income tax (NIT)
which would, in essence, get rid of the notches. Both a priori
reasoning and empirical evidence support the idea that an NIT is
a better way to redistribute income than our current welfare
system.
We, naturally, join the condemnation of the present system
and agree that an NIT would be better. But we believe that the
problem with the current system is not so much that it employs a
notch as that it employs a perverse notch. It is possible that a
notch welfare system would provide positive work incentives for
the working poor.
Specifically, consider the following sort of welfare plan.
Individuals are offered a lump sum grant, G, on the condition
that they work at least a certain number of hours, H*, per year.
If they work less than H* hours, they receive nothing.17 In a
st of simulations not reported here, we compared the current
welfare system, an NIT, and a notch scheme. The notch scheme not
only dominated the status quo, but for certain configurations of
the parameters, it stimulated more labor supply with less excessPage 25
burden than the NIT.
Interestingly, neither intertemporal nor interpersonal
substitution would likely be a problem for a notch welfare scheme
of the sort we propose. Low—wage people have limited
opportunities to vary their hours of work, and a year is already a
long time period as such decisions go. Similarly, the costsof
cheating are probably very substantial in the welfare case.
Presumably, worker A would have to get his employer to report
some of his earnings as if they had been earned by worker B;this
requires the complicity of the employer. Then worker B would
have to be trusted to share the subsidy check that he receives
from the government. The whole thing sounds quite cumbersome.
These and other considerations lead us to suspect that cheating
might not be a major problem for a welfare system thatfeatured a
notch incentive to work.
We have emphasized throughout that the results depend onthe
distribution of individual tastes and endowments. If the ideas
advanced here are deemed to be fruitful, the natural next step
would be to simulate the effect of notch subsidies for realistic
programs using estimated utility function parametersfor a sample
of actual consumers. Such a study would provide a moredefinitive
basis for evaluating the efficacy of notch incentives. All we
have done here is to drop a few, hopefully provocative,hints.Page 2
FOOTNOTES
1. The optimal tax literature has discussed general
conditions under which nonlinear taxation is more efficient than
linear taxation. See Seade [1977]. A notch incentive can be
viewed as a special case of a nonlinear tax which is sufficiently
simple that it is a viable policy option. The two-part tariff is
another well—known example of how departures from linear pricing
can enhance welfare.
2. There are a number of other ways to define excess
burden, but for our purposes the differences are inconsequential.
See Auerbach and Rosen [1980].
3. The indirect utility function (5) cannot be used because
of the discontinuity in the slope of the budget constraint at
F*.
4. That there are 499 individuals rather than 500 is a
quirk of the simulation. Originally, we had let the parameter a
run between .002 and .998, and were forced to omit both endpoints
in order to get an interior solution. When we moved the decimal
point on a we neglected to include a=.lO.
5. Actually, for computational reasons, our "Cobb—Douglas"
case is o =1.01.
6. Note that the product of price times quantity is
approximately unchanged (that is, 30.5 x 0.8 =24.3)because ofPage 27
the Cobb—Douglas utility function.
7. To cite just one comparison, Weicher (1979) presents
estimates that each $1 spent on public housing yields about 85
cents worth of benefits to recipients.
8. Since our tax changes are not infinitesimal, we should
really use the average marginal rate over the relevant range,
which would presumably exceed m.
9.It is far from obvious that this is the rationale for
government subsidization of charitable giving.
10. This discussion assumes that only the aggregate
quantity of the externality-producing commodity matters. In the
case of classical externalities, efficiency requires that each
person's consumption of F be such that the social marginal
benefit equals the marginal cost. Just like standard Pigouvian
subsidies, our scheme ignores the fact that the optimum
corrective subsidy or tax generally differs across individuals.
11. We also report results for m=0.4. The characteristics
of the notch schemes that minimize TEC for rn=O.4 are not very
different from those that minimize it for m=0.2. The minimum was
found by using a simple grid search.
12. Observe from Table I that the comparable figure for a
uniform distribution lies between these two.
13. Presumably, a two—parameter subsidy scheme that
combines a notch with a conventional linear subsidy would be
superior to either pure system. Indeed, this is the case. ButPage 28
when we experimented with such a mixed system, we found that the
optimal two-parameter scheme combined a very large notch with a
linear tax.
14. Australia currently awards a lump sum subsidy to
first—time purchasers of houses. We thank Brian Wright for
informing us of this.
15. Interestingly, a federally sponsored social experiment
conducted several years ago investigated a notch subsidy to
stimulate the consumption of rental housing by the poor. Each
family in the experiment received a lump sum grant if its monthly
housing expenditure exceeded some critical amount. See Venti and
Wise (1984) for details.
16. Bradford (1980) provides a survey of these items.
17. The system we outline provides nothing for households
unable to work. Thus it must be viewed as one component of a
categorical system that also includes an outright dole for those
judged unable to work. Of course, the administrative
difficulties posed by categorical systems is one reason why many
reformers favor the NIT. It is far f rpm clear, however, that any
real world welfare system can be entirely non—categorical. It is
hard to imagine the political process allowing a healthy
u1l—time college student to receive NIT payments, for example.Page 29
REFERENCES
Auerbach,Alan J. and Harvey S. Rosen, "Will the Real Excess
Burden Please Stand Up? (Or, Seven Measures in Search of a
Concept)," National Bureau of Economic Research, Working
Paper No. 495, June 1980.
Ballard, Charles L., John B. Shoven, and John Whalley, "The
Welfare Costs of Distortions in the United States Tax System:
A General Equilibrium Approach," National Bureau of Economic
Research, Working Paper No. 1043, December 1982.
Bradford, David, "The Economics of Tax Policy Towards Savings,"
in George M. von Furstenberg (ed.), The Government and
Capital Formation, Ballinger, 1980.
Hausman, Jerry A., "Income and Payroll Tax Policy and Labor
Supply," in Laurence Meyer (ed.), The Supply Side—Effects of
Economic Policy, St. Louis Federal Reserve Bank, 1981.
Rosen, Harvey S., "Housing Decisions and the U.S. Income Tax: An
Econometric Analysis," Journal of Public Economics, 11,
February 1979, 1—23.
Seade, Jesus, "On the Shape of Optimal Tax Schedules," Journal of
Public Economics, 7, April 1977, 203—235.
Stuart, Charles E., "Welfare Costs Per Dollar of Additional Tax
Revenue in the U.S.," American Economic Review, 74, June
1984, 352—362.
Venti, Steven F. and David A. Wise, "Moving and Housing
Expenditure: Transactions Cost and Disequilibrium," Journal
of Public Economics, 23, February/March 1984, 207—243.
Weicher, John C., "Urban Housing Policy," in P. Mieszkowski and
M. Straszheim (eds.), Current Issues in Urban Economics, The
Johns Hopkins Press, 1979.